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Abstract 
 
This study attempts to uncover the ‘real’ impact of temporary contracts on workers’ perceived job 
quality, prior to the psychological phenomena of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance coming 
into play.  This is done by using a novel conjoint analysis approach that examines the ex ante 
preferences over different contract statuses of a newly generated sample of low-skilled employees from 
seven European countries.  Other things equal, it is shown that the anticipated psychological ‘costs’ of 
moving from a riskless permanent contract to the insecurity of a temporary job or no work at all appear 
to be quite significant.  In contrast, temporary employees, who have presumably already adapted to the 
circumstances surrounding a non-permanent contract, are found to be statistically indifferent between 
permanent and temporary employment, and request much smaller wage premiums in order to switch 
from one status to the other.  The well-documented distress associated with joblessness is also 
confirmed in our data.  The methodology developed here can provide policymakers with an alternative 
and relatively inexpensive method of quantifying the immediate impact of any shift in their employment 
policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 Following the marked structural changes that most economies experienced 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century (such as globalisation, skill-biased 
technological change, growth of service industries, organizational shift to post-Fordist 
workplaces etc.), there was an increasing focus of public policy on so-called ‘flexible’ 
labour markets practices (Harrison, 1998).  These involved the widespread use of 
‘atypical’ forms of employment (part-time work, temporary contracts, low-paid jobs, 
non-standard working hours), all of which were intended to equip employers with 
adequate flexibility to respond to ever-changing circumstances and to retain a 
competitive advantage in the face of global pressures.  While this increased flexibility 
in job market arrangements is believed to have improved the employment and labour 
force participation rates of modern economies, it came into conflict with existing 
social norms of the workplace, since in the past many firms had relied on long-term 
and stable employer-employee relationships as a means of human resource 
management.i  For this reason, it has been argued that the shift to non-standard 
contracts, and the deregulation of the institutional framework that traditionally 
supported vulnerable groups of the working population, has had repercussions on job 
security and individual well-being. 
Economists and policymakers have become increasingly interested in investigating 
the effects of non-standard forms of employment on individuals’ well-being and quality 
of life.  In their strive to do so, it has become commonplace in the literature to use 
subjective measures of well-being as an empirical proxy for the theoretical economic 
concept of ‘utility’ (Locke, 1969; Hamermesh, 1977; Freeman, 1978).ii  Hence, 
economists have typically estimated the utility cost of moving towards precarious 
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forms of employment by examining the differences in the stated job satisfaction of 
individuals who are employed in part-time/temporary jobs with those who enjoy more 
stable full-time/permanent careers (Booth et al., 2000; Kaiser, 2002). 
However, drawing conclusions about the effect of economic and policy changes on 
the basis of differences in the ex post subjective evaluation of individual well-being is 
likely to be misleading.  It has for a long time been acknowledged that satisfaction 
questions suffer from a number of weaknesses, most notably the adaptation effect.  
One of the most remarkable traits of human beings is their ability to adapt to new 
situations, such as an income increase or becoming handicapped, by changing their 
expectations with the passage of time.  Therefore, job satisfaction scores, being a 
measure of individual feelings about every day activity at work, are not likely to be 
constant neither irreversible.  Instead, “they depend on the current work environment, 
are affected by a process of adaptation and coping (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999), 
and are contaminated by cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957)” (Ferrer-i-Carbonell et 
al. 2006).iii 
In light of the above psychological processes, the evaluation of the effect of any 
job characteristic on individual satisfaction is a particularly troublesome issue.  
Opinions about the current job are molded by present reality and are not immutable.  
Due to adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance, the long-run impact on well-being 
of a change in the objective situation of an individual is therefore smaller than one 
would have anticipated a priori or at the instant moment of change (see Brickmen and 
Campbell, 1971; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Helson, 1947; Kahneman et al., 
1999).   
Thus, in order to investigate the real effects of any economic or policy change on 
individual well-being one should attempt to purge the effects of adaptation and 
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cognitive dissonance.  This is admittedly a difficult task, as it is not possible to 
uncover the level of satisfaction that the individual experiences at the instant moment 
of change in his/her circumstances from most available datasets.  The present study, 
however, takes an alternative approach to overcoming the aforementioned 
psychological complications.  Building on the original work of EPICURUS (2005) and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. (2006), it attempts to control for the inevitability of ex post 
adaptation and coping by resorting to a stated preference technique known as conjoint 
analysis (Green et al., 2001).  The novelty of this methodology is that it ultimately 
allows the researcher to uncover the ex ante preferences of a sample of workers over a 
given number of attributes that are typical of most jobs.  In other words, it captures 
how individuals evaluate various hypothetical jobs before they commence, that is, 
prior to the psychological phenomena of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance 
coming into play.  In this manner, it becomes possible to detect the a priori anticipation 
of the effect of a change in the objective situation of an individual on his/her well-
being.   
The focus of this study is to unearth the ‘real’ impact that the greater incidence of 
temporary contractual arrangements in modern job markets has had on workers’ 
evaluation of their jobs.  This is done by examining the ex ante preferences of a sample 
of permanent and temporary employees from seven European countries over different 
contract statuses, with and without taking the issue of endogenous selection into 
account.  Other things equal, it is shown that European employees that enjoy the 
stability of permanency believe that the move towards temporary employment will 
have an adverse impact on the quality of their jobs.  This finding becomes more 
striking when it is contrasted to the preferences of the respective sample of temporary 
employees, who have presumably already adapted to the circumstances surrounding a 
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non-permanent contract.  For this latter group of workers, it is found that they are 
statistically indifferent between permanent and temporary employment, and would 
request much smaller wage premiums in order to be convinced to switch from one 
status to the other.   
Interestingly, the well-documented distress associated with joblessness (Clark and 
Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998; Theodossiou, 1998) also arises in 
this data, in the sense that the sample of permanent (temporary) employees would 
require a 37% (25%) wage premium in order to take up a temporary job that will 
eventually lead to unemployment.  Finally, it is also argued that the comparison of the 
pecuniary trade-offs of permanent employees with those of workers who are already 
experiencing temporary employment, should provide an indication of the extent of 
adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance in monetary terms.   
It is believed that this study makes a contribution towards not only the growing and 
exciting literature on subjective well-being, but mainly towards providing 
policymakers with an alternative and relatively inexpensive method of quantifying the 
immediate impact of any shift in their employment policies.  Importantly, the method 
proposed in this paper could assist governments in assessing the effect of policy 
initiatives at the same time as they are contemplating a change, which, of course, 
cannot be done using ex post satisfaction data i.e. the conjoint approach is forward-
looking.  Ultimately, the evaluation of the ‘full effect’ of an implemented policy 
should be made based on the knowledge of both the ex ante (conjoint) and the ex post 
(satisfaction) preferences of individuals, with the former providing an indication of the 
initial anticipation of the change, prior to the processes of adaptation and cognitive 
dissonance taking effect, and the latter capturing the eventual psychological impact of 
the new circumstance.   
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The present paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews some of the 
existing studies examining the impact of temporary contracts on employee well-being 
using ex post job satisfaction scores.  In Section 3 the conjoint analysis method is 
discussed.  Section 4 describes the data that has been generated for the purposes of this 
study.  In Section 5 the chosen econometric technique to be used in the empirical 
analysis is outlined.  Finally, section 6 contains an extensive discussion of the 
empirical results, providing detailed insight into the intricate workings of the job 
search process of European employees.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
As was mentioned above, with the shift towards ‘atypical’ forms of employment in 
the last quarter of the century, the notion of a ‘job for life’ almost ceased to exist in 
most advanced Western economies.  Individuals in the labour market now experience 
more unstable working lives, with those in part-time or temporary jobs facing far 
shorter job durations and greater job instability compared to those in full-
time/permanent jobs (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995, 1996).  Economists have typically 
attempted to estimate the utility cost of moving towards such precarious modes of 
work, by examining the differences in the stated job satisfaction of individuals who are 
employed in non-standard jobs with those who enjoy more stable full-time/permanent 
positions.  In this manner, Booth et al. (2000) have shown (using data from the first 
seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey) that temporary jobs in the UK are 
not desirable as a means of long-term careers.  They typically pay less than 
corresponding permanent jobs, and are associated with lower levels of job satisfaction 
and poorer work-related training.iv   
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Similarly, using data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001), Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005a) found that temporary, part-time, and 
private sector workers in Greece are strongly dissatisfied compared to those on 
permanent, full-time, and public sector contracts.  However, the extension of their 
analysis to eleven more representative European labour markets (Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou, 2005b) indicated that recent concerns about the negative effect of labour 
market flexibility on the quality and security of work cannot be generalized, but need 
to be considered on a country-by-country basis.  They added that the ultimate effect on 
job satisfaction depends on the institutional and welfare state structure of the countries 
under investigation, which also determines the extent to which individuals who work 
on non-permanent contracts do so by choice rather than compulsion.v   
However, drawing conclusions about the effect of economic and policy changes on 
the basis of differences in the ex post subjective evaluation of individual well-being is 
likely to be misleading, due to the adaptation effect.  It has for a long time been 
acknowledged that since opinions about the current job are molded by the present 
reality and are not immutable, job satisfaction scores are not likely to be constant 
neither irreversible.  Hence, given the workings of the psychological processes of 
adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance, the long-run impact on well-being of a 
change in the objective situation of an individual should be smaller than one would 
have anticipated a priori.   
Of course, one way of avoiding this complication is to uncover the level of 
satisfaction that the individual experiences at the instant moment of change in his/her 
circumstances.  This is the approach that was followed by Leontaridi and Theodossiou 
(2004), who used the BHPS to evaluate the effect of employment status on individual’s 
well-being in the period straight after a labour market transition has occurred.  The 
above argued that in the first period of transition it may be expected that the process of 
adaptation and coping has not yet worked itself out to its full extent.  With this 
assumption, they showed that transitions from full-time employment to joblessness and 
part-time work are associated with a significant reduction in individual utility.        
The present study, however, takes an alternative approach to overcoming the 
aforementioned psychological difficulties.  Building on the original work of 
EPICURUS (2005) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. (2006), it attempts to control for the 
inevitability of ex post adaptation and coping by resorting to a stated preference 
technique known as conjoint analysis.  The novelty of this methodology is that it 
ultimately allows the researcher to uncover the ex ante preferences of a sample of 
workers over a given number of attributes that are typical of most jobs.  In this manner, 
it becomes possible to detect the a priori anticipation of the effect of a change in the 
objective situation of an individual on his/her well-being.  The next section therefore 
turns to a description of this methodology.  
 
3. What is Conjoint Analysis 
 
The main objective of conjoint analysis is to identify how individuals value the 
various attributes of a product or service, such as a job, a house, health care or a nature 
area.vi  In the context of this paper, respondents are presented with and are then asked 
to make choices between alternative hypothetical job scenarios involving different 
levels of attributes that have been identified as important for influencing the quality of 
work.  Assume that a job may be adequately described by i attributes.  Hence, one 
may describe a job by a vector 1 11 1( ,..., )iq q q= , the so called ‘job vignette’.  
Individuals are then offered a list of vignettes, and they are asked to rank those in 
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order of preference and/or to evaluate them on a numerical scale or in terms of verbal 
labels, varying from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’.  In this manner, the respondents are 
forced to trade off some characteristics for others and to incorporate opportunity cost 
into their decision-making process, akin to the way that they make decisions in the 
real world.  The vignettes are eventually analysed in terms of how sensitive the 
answers are with respect to changes in the vignette descriptions.  Conjoint analysis is 
therefore a data collection method that allows the researcher to disentangle the 
individuals’ preferences based on information that they state in a questionnaire.  It is a 
stated preference methodology that is rooted in random utility theory (McFadden, 
1973; Hanemann, 1984; van Beek et al., 1997).   
The creation of such vignettes is not trivial.  There are four steps to this 
methodology:  
Step 1: Identifying the characteristics - The characteristics or attributes characterizing 
a job are identified (e.g. salary, working hours, job security etc.). 
Step 2: Assigning levels to the characteristics - The levels must be plausible and 
actionable, thus encouraging the respondents to take the exercise seriously. 
Step 3: Design of scenarios (vignettes) - Scenarios are drawn up that describe all 
possible job configurations, given the selected job attributes and level possibilities.  
Since the number of scenarios increases with the number of characteristics and levels, 
not all of the scenarios generated can be included in the questionnaire as the 
respondents have a finite attention span.  Thus, experimental designs are used to 
reduce the number to a convenient level. 
Step 4: Establishing preferences - Once designed, the vignettes are offered to 
respondents, who are asked to state their preferences.  Preferences for the scenarios 
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included in the questionnaire are elicited by using one of three methods: ranking, 
rating, or discrete choices.vii   
There are reasonable doubts as to what is the predictive value of preference 
estimation, based on reactions to vignettes.  It may be that real world choice behaviour, 
where respondents are actually faced with the choice between jobs A or B, will differ 
from the choice they make when they are asked to evaluate the two hypothetical 
vignettes A and B.  Economists have traditionally relied on market, or revealed, 
preference (RP) data for investigating the responsiveness of individuals in markets for 
particular goods and services.  In contrast, much scepticism has been displayed against 
stated preferences (SP), due to the perception that choices elicited in hypothetical 
settings are likely to be artificial (i.e. affected by the degree of ‘contextual realism’ one 
establishes for respondents), and that ‘real’ behaviour can only be captured by 
observing what individuals actually do rather than relying on what they say they will 
do.  Yet, a significant number of studies over the last thirty years have now stressed the 
point that “practically speaking, SP and RP preferences seem to match up surprising 
well in different choice contexts, cultures and time periods” (Louviere et al., 2000, p. 
12).  In this sense, “the issue is not if one can or should obtain SP data, but whether 
models estimated from SP data yield valid and reliable inferences about and 
predictions of real market behaviour” (ibid., p. 21).  Thus, as long as respondents 
understand, are committed to and can respond to the hypothetical questionnaires that 
are put before them, coupled with the ability of SP data to yield multiple observations 
per respondent on hypothetical decision contexts that observational data cannot 
possibly capture, there is a strong case in favour of using SP methods.  Particularly for 
the specific research topic of this study, the ability of the vignette approach to 
substantially widen the range of choice alternatives (over the ones that currently exist) 
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allows the researcher to infer the impact of the move towards to a temporary contract 
on employees’ perceptions, prior to them actually taking up the said contract.  In this 
manner, the psychological processes of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance 
can be, in theory, controlled for.         
 
4. Data construction and collection  
 
The data for this study are derived from a survey of workers in lower- and middle-
skilled occupations that was undertaken in August and September 2004 in Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK.  This survey was carried 
out in the aforementioned seven European countries as part of the EPICURUS project, 
a project financed by the European Commission.  The central theme of the project was 
to obtain more insight in the effect of labour market changes on the quality of life of 
European citizens.  During the design stages of the survey, the EPICURUS research 
team ensured that, for the purpose of comparability, all countries would respond to an 
identical questionnaire.  Responsibility for the dissemination, statistical accuracy, and 
data collection process, however, lay with a specialized hired company.  After 
extensive discussion between the research team and the firm, it was decided that due 
to time and budget considerations the focus should be on a homogenous group of 
individuals.  The final sample therefore included salaried workers whose employment 
is the main activity (excluding students), employed in all industries except agriculture 
and fishery, between the age of 18 to 65, with a maximum educational level of 4 in the 
ISCED International Classification of 1997.viii   
The data was collected online from a panel of Internet users, except for Greece 
where face-to-face interviews were organized instead, since the degree of Internet 
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penetration at the time of the survey was relatively low in that country.  Eventually, 
and given the limited scope of the survey, the size of the sample varied in each 
country as follows: 1,011 observations in Denmark, 1,008 in France, 1,007 in the 
Netherlands, 1,002 in the United Kingdom, 800 in Greece, 331 in Finland and 304 in 
Spain.     
In addition to the usual question modules regarding personal and job 
characteristics, a considerable part of the questionnaire was used for offering vignettes 
to the respondents.  A typical vignette is shown in Figure 1.  In the context of this 
research, each individual was offered a set of five vignettes at random, each of them 
consisting of a set of ten attributes relating to a hypothetical job.  Each vignette was a 
description of a job with multiple attributes, such as salary, number of working hours, 
type of contract etc.  Respondents were then asked to ‘evaluate’ each of the five 
vignettes by grading each vignette on a numerical scale from 0 to 10.  From the 
respondents’ evaluations, one is then able to identify which are the job characteristics 
that are valued the most.  The vignettes were described by the following 10 attributes: 
Net wages (described as a percentage of current wages)ix, type of contract, working 
hours, working times, access to training opportunities, whether team work is involved, 
possibilities of control over own work, working tempo in terms of high speed and tight 
deadlines, age of retirement and labour disability, and the loyalty between 
employer/employee (Akerlof, 1982).  The details of the variables and the values they 
can take are presented in Table 1.  A full description of the procedural issues 
surrounding the design of the conjoint questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.  
5. The utility model and the COLS approach  
Following the pioneering work of Lancaster (1966, 1971) and Rosen (1974), it is 
assumed that the utility that a worker derives from his/her job stems from the 
characteristics (attributes) that describe the job, rather than from the job per se.  In our 
case each individual, n, is offered a set of five vignettes , each of which is 
described by ten attributes.  It follows that the first vignette is the vector 
.   
1, 5...,q q
1 1,1 1,10( ,..., )q q q=
It is assumed that an individual’s latent evaluation, Un, of a job, j, depends on the 
attribute values, i, of the job, as specified in the vignette experiment, as well as on the 
individual’s personal and current job characteristics, denoted by Xn.  Hence: 
 
,( ) ( , )n j n j i nU q U q X=  (1) 
 
where Xn captures the influence that the heterogeneity in individual characteristics and 
working experiences is expected to have on the way in which different employees 
evaluate their vignette sequences.  Moreover, if it is further assumed that the 
evaluation of job (vignette) j by individual n, uj,n, is a linear function of the attributes, 
the characteristics of the respondent, and an random error term, nε , then we can 
consider the following latent regression model:  
 
, , ,j n j i n n j nu q X ,β γ ε′ ′= + +  (2) 
 
where the vectors β, γ capture the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on 
his/her stated preference.  
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 The variable uj,n is a latent variable in the sense that its ‘precise’ value is not 
observed exactly.  Instead, in the experiment the answers to the vignette questions 
were measured on a discrete scale 0, 1…,10.  Traditionally in the literature such 
discrete choice models are analyzed by means of Ordered Probit or Logit techniques.  
However, a unique feature of conjoint analysis is that multiple evaluation responses 
are collected for each individual.  Thus, one needs to decide how to take into account 
the fact that if one individual ranks five vignettes, this ranking will be correlated with 
unobserved personal traits of the respondent, like optimism/pessimism.  This implies 
that the five answers from each respondent cannot be regarded as independent, so it is 
necessary for the researcher to employ a model that controls for the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  However, as the introduction of such random or fixed effect techniques 
involves considerable computational cost in a Logit/Probit setting, combined with the 
fact that the econometric analysis of this paper seeks to correct for sample selection, it 
has been necessary to adopt an appropriate linearization of the ordinal evaluation 
responses.        
The linearization used in the context of this study is the Cardinal OLS (COLS) 
approach (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, chapter 2).  This econometric 
model presumes that respondents are supplying a cardinal evaluation, but it takes into 
account that they could not precisely give information about their evaluation, due to 
the categorical format of the response categories.  Their answers were restricted to the 
set of integer numbers between 0 and 10 instead.  The assumption is that if someone 
evaluates a vignette with a 6, the true valuation lies somewhere between 5.5 and 6.5.  
If the true evaluation is 5.3, the respondent would have answered 5.  Hence, an answer 
6 implies that for the exact evaluation  the following inequality holds: ( )n jU q
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≤5.5 ( , ) 6.5n j nU q X< .  Now assume 110 Un(.) to be a standard normal distribution 
function , where the first factor accounts for the normalization to the [0,10]-
interval.x  If  is defined by 
(.; ,1)N 0
0.55u 0.55( ; ,1) 0.5N u 50 = , that is the 55%-quantile, and 
similarly for , the previous inequality is equivalent with 0.65u 0.55 0.65( , )n j nu U q X u< ≤  
or 0.55 , , , , 0.65j n j i n n j nu u q X uβ γ ε′ ′< = + + ≤ .  Now the COLS approach replaces the 
inexactly known value uj,n by its conditional expectation ,j nu  (Maddala, 1983, p.366): 
  
 
0.55 0.65
, 0.55 , 0.65
0.65 0.55
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )j n j n
n u n uu E u u u
N u N u
−= < ≤ = −  
(3) 
 
 
where n(.) and N(.) stand for the standard normal density and distribution functions, 
respectively.  The use of this formula does not require previous estimation of the 
underlying model parameters β, γ.  
 
6. Econometric Methodology  
 
After the original evaluation of the vignette has been transformed into its 
conditional mean, OLS can be applied to the linear model 
 
, , ,j n j i n n j nu q X ,β γ ε′ ′= + +  (4) 
 
where ,j nε  is a symmetric error term with mean zero.  This COLS-method has been 
shown to yield consistent parameter estimates (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers, 2004; 
also see Stewart, 1983).  It is a variant of the so-called ‘interval regression’ method.  
This approach yields parameter estimates that are nearly identical to those obtained by 
Ordered Probit (except for a factor of proportionality), are as efficient as Probit-
estimation (as the t-values are approximately the same), but it is computationally 
much easier.  It is also important to note that the so-called ‘trade-off’ ratios (β/γ), that 
is the extent to which one job characteristic can deteriorate if the worker is 
simultaneously compensated by an improvement in another, thus leaving the 
individual indifferent between the two situations, are not dependent on the specific 
method used.  The reason is that the COLS procedure outlined above, which entails a 
specific monotonic labeling convention, describes the same indifference curves as the 
more traditional Ordered Probit/Logit maximum likelihood estimates.     
Furthermore, in order to take into account the probable correlation structure 
between the five individual vignette evaluations, a random effects model has been 
employed in this study (Wooldridge, 2002).xi  Thus, the basic estimation procedure 
that is utilized is to estimate the following valuation equation: 
 
, , ,j n j i n n n j nu q X ,β γ ε η′ ′= + + +  (5) 
 
using the familiar random effects model of panel analysis, where εn is the random 
individual term that is invariant to the alternative vignettes, and ηj,n is a pure random 
error term with E(ηj,n) = 0 and E(εn, ηj,n) = 0.   
Moreover, as the aim of the study is to separately examine the ex ante preferences 
over different contract statuses of a sub-sample of permanent and temporary 
employees, it is necessary to employ a Heckman-type model in order to correct for the 
potential incidental truncation problem that arises.  After all, it is unlikely that 
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individuals are randomly allocated into either permanent or temporary contracts, as 
people tend to self-select into the type of contractual arrangement that suits them best.  
It follows that if selectivity is not taken into account, an OLS regression using the 
selected non-random sub-samples will lead to inconsistent estimates (Heckman, 1979).  
Thus, in order to correct for this issue, a “switching regression model with endogenous 
switching” has also been employed in this paper (Lee, 1978).  Though the description 
of the technical details of the estimation is left for the Appendix, the empirical results 
are presented in the Tables discussed below, alongside those that have not corrected 
for the issue of endogenous selection. 
 
7. Empirical Results 
 
The estimation of equations (5), (A4) and (A5) was based on a pooled sample of 
workers from seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, France, 
Greece, Spain and the UK), split according to their contractual status in their main job 
at the time of the EPICURUS survey. xii  Among a total sample of 5463 individuals, 
4507 (82.52%) declared that their job involved a permanent contract (with no fixed 
ending time), while 494 (9.05%) were on fixed-term employment.  The remaining 
percentage of workers was engaged in casual, seasonal, or other work, so they were 
dropped from the analysis.  Given that with the vignette experiment five responses 
were amassed on average per individual, the total sample of our dataset included 
26755 observations, with 22075 of those referring to individuals on permanent 
employment, and 2430 to fixed-term employees.  Some representative descriptive 
statistics for these two groups of workers are shown in Table 2, while Figure 2 plots 
the distributions of their evaluation responses over various contract options that were 
offered in the vignettes.  
 
Ex ante preferences of permanent workers 
The empirical results for the sample of permanent workers only are displayed in 
Table 3.  These are generated from the estimation of, firstly, the job evaluation 
equation (5), which only corrects for individual and current job characteristics, and, 
subsequently, equation (A4), which also accounts for selectivity.  They are based on 
the specific quadratic empirical relationship: 
 
2
, 1 2 3
1
,
( / ) ln( ) ln( )
( )
l k
j n l iln n n n n
l
n Pn n j
u D dW W hours hours
X
α β β β
nγ λ η ε
=
=
= + + + +
′+ + + +
∑  
(6) 
 
 
where are dummy variables measuring the k sub-categories of the i characteristics 
of the job profiles, Wn is the wage of respondent n, and ln(hours) the logarithm of 
working hours.  Accordingly, Table 4 reports the trade-offs between the various 
attributes and changes in percentage of the wage, also known as the marginal 
willingness to pay, indicating the extent of monetary compensation that an individual 
would require following a deterioration in another job dimension, in order to keep 
him/her on the same indifference curve.  This is given by the following ratio: 
ilD
  
 
1
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From Table 3 it can be seen that, other things equal, European employees that 
enjoy the stability of a permanent contract believe that the move towards temporary 
employment will have a detrimental impact on the quality of their jobs.  In particular, 
it is found that in order to induce these permanent workers to accept a temporary 
contract with prospects of continuation to another permanent or temporary contract, 
they would require a 15,5% and a 14% wage premium over their current wages, 
respectively.  Moreover, the well-documented distress associated with joblessness 
(Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998; Theodossiou, 1998) 
also arises in the data, as it is found that permanent employees would require a 37% 
wage premium in order to take up a temporary job that will eventually lead to 
unemployment.  So the anticipated psychological ‘costs’ of moving from a riskless 
permanent contract to the insecurity of a temporary job or no work at all appear to be 
quite significant, especially amongst the sample of low-skilled European employees 
that is analysed in this study.        
 
Ex ante preferences of temporary workers 
While it was argued above that the elicitation of the preferences of permanent 
employees should provide an indication of the impact of non-permanent jobs on job 
quality prior to any psychological adaptation processes taking effect, this should not be 
the case for those individuals who already hold such contracts.  For this latter group of 
workers it is expected that their subjective evaluation of the quality of different 
hypothetical jobs is already affected by their current experience with non-standard 
employment.  The effects of adaptation and coping, and the attempt to reduce the 
dissonance associated with insecure contractual agreements, should therefore be 
ingrained in their answers to the conjoint exercise.  In other words, it should hold that 
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the trade-offs of individuals who are currently in temporary employment are smaller 
than those of their permanent equivalents, as temporary workers have already adjusted 
their perceptions to the conditions surrounding a fixed-term contract.     
Indeed, Tables 3 and 4 confirm that this a priori expectation is borne out in the 
data.  Regardless of whether selectivity is corrected for, the coefficients and monetary 
trade-offs arising out of the responses of the sample of temporary workers are smaller 
than the ones that were estimated for the permanent sub-sample.  Specifically, based 
on the temporary workers’ responses, a 5% wage premium should be paid to equalize 
the value of permanent employment with a temporary job leading to permanency, 
while 2-3% compensation over current wages should be offered to those on temporary 
contracts who are likely to continue on a similar arrangement.  This is significantly 
different to the 14-15% trade-offs that were found previously for the sample of 
permanent workers.   
Interestingly, it is also found that for those who are currently in temporary work, 
the option of being in temporary employment with prospects of continuation (either 
with another permanent or temporary contract) does not yield significant disutility 
compared to riskless permanency.  This is in stark contrast to the significant negative 
effect that such contracts have on the perceived quality of jobs of permanent workers, 
and arises presumably because temporary employees have already adapted to their 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, for both groups what can be characterized as a “dead-
end contract” (i.e. temporary work with no prospects of continuation) is significantly 
less preferred to a permanent contract with no risk of being fired.  Remarkably, a 
strong negative effect is also found for those individuals who are already in temporary 
jobs, thus implying that the psychological cost of joblessness is quite substantial and 
persists even in the face of adaptation and coping.  In particular, it can be seen from 
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Table 4 that despite any acclimatization, temporary workers would still demand a 25% 
wage premium over their current wages in order to feel indifferent between a dead-end 
and a riskless permanent contract (compare this to the 38% trade-off of permanent 
workers).   
 
Capturing the monetary value of adaptation 
As a final endeavour it is argued in this paper that the comparison of the pecuniary 
trade-offs of permanent employees, which are supposedly stripped of psychological 
adaptation effects, with those of individuals who are currently in temporary 
employment, and have already adjusted to their insecure working conditions, should 
capture the extent of adaptation to non-permanent contracts in monetary terms.  This 
has been done in Table 4, where it is asserted that the financial difference between the 
trade-offs of permanent and temporary employees can be interpreted as a measure of 
the impact of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance on peoples’ perceptions 
regarding the quality of their jobs.  As can be seen from the table, it would appear that 
due to the aforementioned psychological processes European employees who have 
already experienced a non-permanent contract request a 10-12% smaller wage 
premium over their current wages compared to those who have not.   
 
8. Conclusions 
 
It is clear from the conjoint analysis evidence that is presented above that the 
anticipated psychological ‘costs’ of moving from a riskless permanent contract to the 
insecurity of a temporary job or no work at all appear to be quite significant, especially 
amongst the low-skilled who have usually been the group that has borne the brunt of 
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the move towards flexible employment practices.  Moreover, it was also shown that 
the workings of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance do, in fact, appear to 
make individuals more content with their current state of affairs.  Of course, it may be 
argued that the empirical results of this paper suffer from the inability to control for the 
respondents’ previous employment experiences.  For instance, if some of the 
permanent workers in the sample had been employed in temporary jobs in the past, 
some adaptation would be expected to have taken place in those people’s minds, which 
could result in them requesting smaller wage premiums in order to take up a temporary 
job (i.e. the trade-offs calculated in Table 4 would underestimate the ‘true’ cost of non-
permanent contracts).   
Though this argument is valid, it has not been possible for this study to take the 
respondents’ previous employment status into consideration, as this information was 
not available in the dataset.  In addition, in order to fully address this specific concern, 
the researcher would ideally require a panel vignette dataset, from which he/she would 
be able to trace the monetary trade-offs of individuals throughout time.  This, of 
course, could not be done with the single cross-sectional EPICURUS data that were 
utilized here.  It is worth pointing out, though, that although past experience with 
temporary contracts could affect the perceptions of permanent employees, it should 
also be true that the process of cognitive dissonance could work in the reverse 
direction.  In other words, once reemployed in a permanent job, individuals readjust 
their ‘dissonance’ to their new secure circumstance, in which case their responses to 
the conjoint questionnaire would once again accurately reflect the ‘true’ cost of 
temporary contractual forms of employment on the perceived quality of jobs.  
An important point to make in conclusion is that throughout this study the implicit 
assumption was made that the respondents of the EPICURUS survey were adequately 
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informed agents of the labour market, whose knowledge of the conditions surrounding 
a fixed-term or permanent contract was sufficient for the purposes of engaging in the 
hypothetical job evaluation exercise to which they were exposed.  
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Figure 1. Typical vignette 
 
Imagine that, for some reason, you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new 
one.  Imagine that after a short time you get several offers.  We will list them on the following 
screen.  These listed job offers do not differ from your current job except for some points we 
specifically mention.  
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible 
and 10 the best possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?” 
  
Wage: 20% more than now per hour 
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay 
Working hours: 20 hours a week  
Working times: Rotating shift system  
Training opportunities: The employer will offer you a 10 workdays training program in the 
course of the year 
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team 
Work conditions: No one controls your work 
Work speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to work 
at high speed 
Retirement: You can retire at age 55 
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms. No loyalty from both sides. 
Shirking and low performance is possible 
 
How would you rate this offer?……. 
Please, evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the best 
possible job. 
 
Would this job offer be acceptable to you? Yes/No 
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Table 1: The vignette’s attributes 
Variable 
Type of contract (dummy variables) 
Permanent contract with no risk of being fired 
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation  
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation 
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent contract 
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary contract 
(reference: One-year contract with no probability of continuation) 
Ln(Working hours)  (Working hours ranged from 20 to 50) 
Net wages per hour: expressed as a percentage of wages at the current job 
Working schedules (dummy variables) 
Flexible working hours 
Office working hours (you can choose which days your work) 
Rotating shifts (system) 
Training (dummy variables) 
3 months training  
1 month training 
10 days training  
5 days training  
1 day training 
no training 
Work organization (dummy variables) 
Job not in teamwork  
Job in varying teamwork 
(reference: Job in fixed team) 
Control over own work (dummy variables) 
Job has a fixed routine 
Can choose order tasks: job tasks are fixed, but you may decide when & how things are done 
(reference: No one controls your work) 
Intensity due to high speed (dummy variables) 
Often high speed 
Sometimes high speed 
(reference: never working at high speed) 
Intensity due to tight deadlines (dummy variables) 
Often tight deadlines 
Sometimes tight deadlines 
(reference: never working with tight deadlines) 
Retirement & Labour disability (dummy variables) 
Have to stop before 65 (have to stop before 65 because the job is physically very demanding) 
Early retirement 55 (firm has early retirement plans) 
Early retirement 60 (firm has early retirement plans) 
(reference: the firm has no early retirement plans) 
Loyalty-no shirking(dummy variables) 
 Loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance impossible 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Job evaluation responses of temporary (upper graph) vs. permanent 
(lower graph) workers over different contract statuses 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by contract status    
Variable 
Mean 
perm
Mean 
temp Min Max
Evaluation Vignette 4.067 4.620 0 10
Type of contract (dummy variables)     
Permanent contract with no risk of being fired 0.124 0.136 0 1
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation  0.179 0.175 0 1
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation 0.243 0.242 0 1
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent contract 0.160 0.158 0 1
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary contract 0.117 0.109 0 1
(reference: One-year contract with no probability of continuation)     
Ln(Working hours)  (Working hours ranged from 20 to 50) 3.5415 3.5417 2.996 3.912
Net wages per hour: expressed as a percentage of wages at the current job -0.0193 -0.0187 -0,5 0,5
Working schedules (dummy variables)     
Flexible working hours 0.172 0.164 0 1
Office working hours (you can choose which days your work) 0.282 0.281 0 1
Rotating shifts (system) 0.313 0.322 0 1
(reference: working times decided by employer)     
Training (dummy variables)     
1-3 months training 0.313 0.332 0 1
5-10 days training 0.426 0.409 0 1
(reference: 1 day training or no training)     
Work organization (dummy variables)     
Job not in teamwork  0.305 0.298 0 1
Job in varying teamwork 0.318 0.317 0 1
(reference: Job in fixed team)     
Control over own work (dummy variables)     
Job has a fixed routine 0.404 0.386 0 1
Can choose order tasks: job tasks are fixed, but you may decide when & how things are done 0.334 0.356 0 1
(reference: No one controls your work)     
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Intensity due to high speed (dummy variables)     
Often high speed 0.243 0.231 0 1
Sometimes high speed 0.158 0.167 0 1
(reference: never working at high speed)     
Intensity due to tight deadlines (dummy variables)     
Often tight deadlines 0.157 0.159 0 1
Sometimes tight deadlines 0.168 0.181 0 1
(reference: never working with tight deadlines)     
Retirement & Labour disability (dummy variables)     
Have to stop before 65 (have to stop before 65 because the job is physically very demanding) 0.116 0.111 0 1
Early retirement 55 (firm has early retirement plans) 0.199 0.196 0 1
Early retirement 60 (firm has early retirement plans) 0.242 0.245 0 1
(reference: the firm has no early retirement plans)     
Loyalty-no shirking (dummy variables)     
Loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance impossible 0.429 0.450 0 1
 
Job/Individual characteristics     
Age 37.877 31.856 16 65
Female 0.515 0.457 0 1
Married 0.706 0.554 0 1
Jobtenure 8.935 2.560 0.6 44
Twojobs 0.093 0.172 0 1
Unemp last year 0.062 0.386 0 1
Sector     
Non-profit instit 0.068 0.078 0 1
Civil serv. 0.185 0.193 0 1
Public company 0.113 0.098 0 1
(ref. private company)     
Ln(monthly net wage) 7.504 7.207 0 12.899
Ln(Contract work hours/week) 3.532 3.494 0 4.522
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Occupation     
 Managers/Professionals 0.064 0.070 0 1
Technical/Clerical 0.407 0.345 0 1
(ref. other)     
Working times     
Always same workg.times 0.534 0.521 0 1
Rotating shifts 0.141 0.143 0 1
Employee decides 0.064 0.140 0 1
Employee+employer decide 0.135 0.072 0 1
(ref. decided by employer)     
Work organization     
Job in fixed team 0.672 0.660 0 1
Job in varying teamwork 0.147 0.180 0 1
(ref. Job not in teamwork)     
Training     
5-10 days 0.356 0.238 0 1
1-3 months 0.060 0.077 0 1
(ref. no training or in the past)     
Control over own work     
Job has a fixed routine 0.272 0.400 0 1
Can choose order tasks 0.658 0.536 0 1
(ref. No one controls your work)     
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Table 3: Random effects COLS job evaluation regressions by contract status 
         
 Controls Selection 
 Permanent    Temporary Permanent Temporary
         Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef s.e.
Vignette description         
Type of contract         
Perm.cont. risk w comp. -0.15        (0.023)*** -0.105 (0.072) -0.144 (0.024)*** -0.097 (0.075)
Perm.cont. risk w no comp. -0.348 (0.022)*** -0.289     (0.069)*** -0.342 (0.022)*** -0.291 (0.072)***
Temp.cont. to perm.cont -0.171 (0.022)*** -0.067 (0.069) -0.171 (0.022)*** -0.057 (0.072) 
Temp.cont. to temp.cont -0.158 (0.025)*** -0.042 (0.077) -0.163 (0.026)*** -0.028 (0.081) 
Temp.cont.to unempl. -0.417 (0.028)*** -0.327 (0.09)*** -0.407 (0.029)*** -0.317 (0.093)*** 
(ref. Perm.cont. no risk.)         
Ln(Working hours) 7.932       (0.619)*** 10.269 (1.973)*** 7.954 (0.643)*** 10.458 (2.05)***
Ln(Working hours)^2 -1.201       (0.089)*** -1.531 (0.284)*** -1.207 (0.092)*** -1.554 (0.295)***
Wages (in % of current 
income) 1.106       (0.02)*** 1.297 (0.066)*** 1.089 (0.021)*** 1.275 (0.069)***
Working times         
Flexible working hours         0.12 (0.023)*** 0.062 (0.075) 0.128 (0.024)*** 0.083 (0.078)
Office working hours         0.097 (0.02)*** 0.105 (0.062)* 0.103 (0.02)*** 0.109 (0.065)*
Rotating shifts -0.07 (0.019)*** -0.081 (0.061)     -0.064 (0.019)*** -0.07 (0.063)
(ref. work. times decided by 
employer)         
Training         
5-10 days         0.112 (0.018)*** 0.084 (0.058) 0.107 (0.019)*** 0.069 (0.06)
1-3 months         0.065 (0.017)*** 0.134 (0.055)** 0.061 (0.017)*** 0.119 (0.058)**
(ref. No training or in the past)          
Work organization         
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Job not in teamwork 0.014 (0.016) 0.061 (0.052) 0.01 (0.017) 0.048 (0.054) 
Job in varying teamwork -0.023 (0.016) -0.029      (0.052) -0.026 (0.017) -0.032 (0.054)
(reference: Job in fixed team)         
Control over own work         
Job has a fixed routine -0.133 (0.017)*** -0.136      (0.056)** -0.133 (0.018)*** -0.135 (0.058)**
Can choose order tasks         0.016 (0.018) 0.034 (0.058) 0.008 (0.019) 0.039 (0.06)
(ref. noone controls your work)         
Intensity due to high speed         
Often high speed -0.176       (0.018)*** -0.299 (0.059)*** -0.18 (0.019)*** -0.325 (0.061)***
Sometimes high speed -0.031 (0.021) 0.026      (0.066) -0.024 (0.021) -0.013 (0.069)
(ref. never work at high speed)         
Intensity due to tight deadlines         
Often tight deadlines -0.127 (0.02)*** -0.027      (0.063) -0.128 (0.02)*** -0.011 (0.067)
Sometimes tight deadlines -0.034 (0.02)* -0.102      (0.062)* -0.041 (0.02)** -0.126 (0.065)*
(ref. never work tight deadlines)         
Retirement         
Have to stop before 65 0.069 (0.027)** 0.052 (0.088) 0.051 (0.028)* 0.048 (0.092) 
Early retirement 55 0.204       (0.022)*** 0.275 (0.071)*** 0.201 (0.022)*** 0.272 (0.074)***
Early retirement 60         0.23 (0.022)*** 0.108 (0.069) 0.222 (0.023)*** 0.107 (0.071)
(ref. firm has no early retirement 
plans)         
No loyalty-shirking -0.101       (0.014)*** -0.151 (0.045)*** -0.101 (0.014)*** -0.157 (0.047)***
         
Job/indiv. characteristics         
Male 0.009        (0.019) 0.026 (0.061) 0.006 (0.02) 0.034 (0.064)
Age         -0.031 (0.007)*** -0.034 (0.02)* -0.033 (0.007)*** -0.038 (0.026)
Agesq 0.00034     (0.00008)** 0.00044 (0.00026)* 0.00037 (0.00009)** 0.00050 (0.00033)
Married         0.004 (0.02) 0.067 (0.06) 0.005 (0.022) 0.071 (0.067)
Jobtenure       -0.006 (0.004)* -0.005 (0.016) -0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.048)
Jobtenuresq         0.00019 (0.00011)* 0.00015 (0.00056) 0.00016 (0.00011) -0.00013 (0.00117)
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Twojobs         -0.001 (0.031) 0.099 (0.078) 0.005 (0.032) 0.054 (0.105)
Unemp last year -0.038 (0.037) -0.039 (0.061)     -0.046 (0.047) -0.054 (0.197)
Ln(monthly net wage) -0.002        (0.02) -0.044 (0.063) 0.001 (0.021) -0.044 (0.075)
Ln(Contract work hours/week) 0.175        (0.039)*** 0.086 (0.084) 0.171 (0.04)*** 0.129 (0.093)
Sector         
Non-profit instit.        -0.058 (0.042) -0.322 (0.124)*** -0.043 (0.045) -0.349 (0.162)**
Civil serv. -0.033        (0.032) -0.084 (0.094) -0.028 (0.033) -0.093 (0.137)
Public company         0.001 (0.029) -0.07 (0.094) -0.002 (0.031) -0.084 (0.125)
(ref. private company)         
Industry         
Manufacturing         0.045 (0.032) 0.021 (0.105) 0.043 (0.034) 0.059 (0.118)
Wholesale/retail trade 0.001 (0.033) -0.109 (0.104) 0.004 (0.035) -0.09 (0.112) 
Services 0.003        (0.028) 0.016 (0.082) 0.01 (0.03) 0.033 (0.103)
Public admin/education/health         0.01 (0.034) -0.021 (0.091) 0.008 (0.035) -0.011 (0.094)
(ref. other)         
Occupation         
Managers/Professionals         0.046 (0.04) 0.01 (0.126) 0.037 (0.041) 0.007 (0.151)
Technical/Clerical  -0.045 (0.02)** 0.048 (0.063) -0.05 (0.021)** 0.046 (0.066)
(ref. other)         
Working times         
Always same workg.times         -0.036 (0.029) -0.027 (0.092) -0.039 (0.03) -0.097 (0.101)
Rotating shifts 0.008        (0.036) 0.111 (0.114) 0.009 (0.038) 0.057 (0.122)
Employee decides -0.028 (0.046) 0.02 (0.111) -0.046 (0.048) -0.04 (0.125) 
Employee+employer decide         -0.028 (0.036) 0.156 (0.135) -0.026 (0.037) 0.11 (0.147)
(ref. decided by employer)         
Work organization         
Job in fixed team 0.001 (0.024) -0.085 (0.079) 0.01 (0.025) -0.09 (0.084) 
Job in varying teamwork -0.01 (0.032) -0.274     (0.099)*** 0.008 (0.034) -0.319 (0.114)***
(ref. Job not in teamwork)         
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Training         
5-10 days         -0.03 (0.02) -0.051 (0.066) -0.032 (0.02) -0.069 (0.089)
1-3 months         -0.037 (0.039) -0.051 (0.106) -0.037 (0.041) -0.065 (0.112)
(ref. no training or in the past)          
Control over own work         
Job has a fixed routine -0.053 (0.039) 0.005      (0.118) -0.056 (0.041) -0.007 (0.131)
Can choose order tasks -0.031 (0.036) 0.028 (0.11) -0.035 (0.037) 0.036 (0.13) 
(ref. No one controls your work)         
Country dummies         
Denmark  -0.012        (0.061) 0.096 (0.19) -0.022 (0.064) 0.046 (0.269)
France  -0.119 (0.03)*** 0.033 (0.105)     -0.118 (0.032)*** -0.016 (0.144)
Greece  -0.007 (0.035) -0.02 (0.112)     -0.007 (0.037) -0.084 (0.202)
Netherlands          0.07 (0.031)** 0.089 (0.11) 0.057 (0.033)* 0.073 (0.177)
Spain  0.212 (0.046)*** 0.287 (0.116)** 0.227 (0.05)*** 0.192 (0.247) 
Finland          0.339 (0.045)*** 0.231 (0.145) 0.337 (0.046)*** 0.18 (0.212)
(ref. UK)          
         
mills     0.038 (0.141) 0.035 (0.135) 
cons        -12.937 (1.089)*** -16.44 (3.443)*** -12.915 (1.132)*** -16.71 (3.592)***
N 
Number of groups    
Wald chi2(61/62)       
R-sq:  within   
between 
overall 
17738 
3582 
6860.36*** 
0.307 
0.153 
0.253 
1809 
365 
852.06*** 
0.35 
0.216 
0.31 
16565 
3344 
6284.84*** 
0.302 
0.154 
0.25 
1679 
339 
776.75*** 
0.344 
0.226 
0.309 
Notes:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; columns (1)-(4) contain estimates of eq. (5), while columns (5)-(8) of eqs. 
(A4)-(A5). 
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Table 4: Trade-off ratios and measure of adaptation by contract status  
        
   Trade-off  Measure of adaptation 
      Temp-perm Temp-temp Temp-unem Temp-perm  Temp-temp Temp-unem
Temporary -0.051   -0.033 -0.252Controls 
Permanent    
   
-0.155 -0.143 -0.377
-0.104 -0.110 -0.125
Temporary -0.045   -0.022 -0.249Selection 
Permanent    
   
-0.157 -0.150 -0.374
-0.112 -0.128 -0.125
Notes: The trade-off ratios are calculated from application of eq. (7); the measure of adaptation is given by the difference of the 
respective figures for permanent and temporary employees e.g. Temp-perm (controls): measure = -0.155-(-0.051) = -0.104.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Procedural issues with respect to the design of the conjoint questionnaire 
 
During the design stages of the survey, the EPICURUS research team ensured that, 
for the purpose of comparability, all countries would respond to an identical 
questionnaire.  This entailed having the text of the survey translated into each 
country’s language by native speakers, so as to avoid any inconsistencies in 
terminology. 
The data was collected online from a panel of Internet users, except for Greece 
where face-to-face interviews were organized instead, since the degree of Internet 
penetration at the time of the survey was relatively low in that country.  The members 
were invited by e-mail to answer the questionnaire, and within this large population 
respondents were screened through their answers to the first five questions.  Each 
member of the panel that did not fulfill the criteria of stratification was then forced to 
stop answering the questionnaire and was thanked for their cooperation.  All necessary 
efforts were made so that the face-to-face interviews in Greece were comparable and 
of a similar format to the internet version faced by the respondents of the other six 
countries of the survey. 
Each individual was offered a set of five vignettes at random, each of them 
consisting of a set of ten attributes relating to a hypothetical job.  Although the five 
vignettes were supplied in a specific order, respondents could review each of the five 
vignettes as often as they liked by going backwards and forwards in order to compare 
the vignettes (Greeks could specifically request from their interviewer to review the 
vignettes, while in the other countries the respondents could simultaneously compare 
all of their vignettes on their PC screens).  With this method the problem of ordering 
effects was eliminated.   
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Each vignette was a description of a job with multiple attributes, such as salary, 
number of working hours, type of contract etc.  It is evident that this specific choice of 
attributes is by no means an exhaustive characterisation of a typical job situation.  
Nevertheless, it is believed that it is sufficient for the purpose of the present analysis, 
bearing in mind that a full characterisation of a real job situation is impossible.   
In order to keep the structure of each vignette simple, readable, and easy to 
understand, the included text in the vignettes was fairly short (see Figure 1).  This 
facilitated the task of comparing vignettes.  However, this could pose a problem, as 
some attributes cannot be adequately explained by means of a few words.  In order to 
overcome this difficulty, some attributes were further explained by including an 
additional information facility.  In the Internet version of the questionnaire the 
respondent was able to click and to obtain extra information, while in the face-to-face 
interviews the respondent could prompt for further information from the interviewer. 
The vignette description was completed by indicating to the respondent that all the 
other aspects of the hypothetical job, except for the dimensions explicitly mentioned in 
the vignette, are similar to the respondent’s own present working conditions.    
Respondents were finally asked to ‘evaluate’ each of the five vignettes by grading 
them on a numerical scale from 0 to 10.  The choice of the rating method using a scale 
from 0 to 10 was made so that the respondents’ answers to the vignette experiment 
were comparable to the conventional question regarding their satisfaction with their 
current job, which was also rated on a 0-10 scale in the EPICURUS survey. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2:  The selection model between alternative contract statuses 
As is standard with this model, a “selection equation” which describes the latent 
propensity, P*, of each individual taking up either a temporary or a permanent contract 
is firstly estimated: 
 
* n nP Zδ ν′= +  (A1) 
 
where Zn is a vector of all exogenous variables in the model (with at least one 
determining the employee’s selection, but excluded from the structural evaluation 
equation (5)), and v is the disturbance term with E(Zn, v) = 0 and v ~ N(0,1).  While P* 
is unobserved, the probability of the individual belonging in either contractual status 
can be calculated using a random effects probit model.  The estimated coefficients 
from this equation, , are then used for the calculation of the inverse Mills ratios (one 
for each group), as is illustrated below: 
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Finally, in the second step two valuation equations (one for the permanent, P, and 
one for the temporary, T, sample of employees) are estimated, including the respective 
Mills ratios as additional controls, as follows: 
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, ,j n j n Pn n j nu q Xβ γ λ ε η′ ′= + + + +  (A4) 
 
, ,j n j n Tn n j nu q Xβ γ λ ε η′ ′= + + + +  (A5) 
 
The estimated coefficients of β and γ should now provide consistent estimates of 
the marginal effect of the attributes and of the current individual and job 
characteristics on the individuals’ evaluation of the quality of their jobs. 
For the estimation of the selection equation (A1) a random effects probit model 
was employed, which regressed the probability of the individual being in either 
permanent or temporary employment on the full set of exogenous variables (q, X).  A 
dummy variable indicating whether there were children over the age of 16 in the 
household was also used for identification purposes.xiii  Indeed, Table A1 confirms that 
the presence of children of working age in the family house is positively associated 
with the probability of the respondent being in a non-permanent job, and that this 
relationship is sufficiently strong (the z-value of 3.65 satisfies the rank condition).  
This may reflect the fact that for families with children of working age, there is a 
higher probability of parents (especially, mothers) returning to the labour force (and 
most likely taking up a temporary job), as the responsibilities of rearing/childcare are 
now lessened.  Moreover, it is plausible that the spreading of the household costs 
across a wider base should now allow for some of its members to take up part-
time/temporary jobs (assuming that the children can now contribute to the financial 
obligations of the household).  In addition, it is believed that there is no compelling 
reason for this variable to influence the respondents’ valuations of the different 
hypothetical job scenarios.  After all, as shown by Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. (2006), the 
introduction of individual personal characteristics into the valuation equation (5) does 
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not change the effect that the vignette attributes have on the vignette evaluation.  This 
is an implication of the fact that the vignettes were randomly allotted to the 
respondents without any reference to their individual characteristics, which implies 
block-orthogonality.  
With regards to the remaining regressors, it is found that public sector workers, 
individuals who embark on multiple-job holding and those who were unemployed 
during the previous year, have a significantly higher probability of being in temporary 
employment.  U-shaped age and tenure effects are also unearthed, thus implying that 
younger workers are more likely to be using such non-permanent forms of 
employment as stepping stones for their future career progression, whilst the elderly 
presumably enjoy their relative flexibility.  Temporary jobs are also more likely to be 
taken up by low-paid individuals, and are negatively correlated with the provision of 
short-term on-the-job training (duration 5-10 days).  
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Table A1: Random effects probit regression of temporary vs. permanent 
contract status 
 Coef s.e. 
Male -0.101 (0.135) 
Age -0.123 (0.046)*** 
Agesq 0.001 (0.001)** 
Married -0.026 (0.151) 
Jobtenure -0.374 (0.028)*** 
Jobtenuresq 0.009 (0.001)*** 
Twojobs 0.699 (0.199)*** 
Unemp last year 2.081 (0.176)*** 
Ln(monthly net wage) -0.385 (0.139)*** 
Ln(Contract work hours/week) -0.075 (0.231) 
S ector   
Non-profit instit. 0.773 (0.297)*** 
Civil serv. 0.922 (0.225)*** 
Public company 0.765 (0.221)*** 
( ref. private company)   
I ndustry   
Manufacturing -0.485 (0.242)** 
Wholesale/retail trade -0.397 (0.225)* 
Services -0.491 (0.194)** 
Public admin/education/health -0.112 (0.227) 
( ref. other)   
O ccupation   
Managers/Professionals 0.549 (0.267)** 
Technical/Clerical -0.184 (0.141) 
( ref. other)   
W orking times   
Always same workg.times -0.134 (0.215) 
Rotating shifts -0.326 (0.262) 
Employee decides 0.511 (0.286)* 
Employee+employer decide -0.256 (0.276) 
( ref. work.times decided by employer)   
W ork organization   
Job in fixed team -0.036 (0.175) 
Job in varying teamwork 0.355 (0.227) 
( ref. Job not in teamwork)   
T raining   
5-10 days -0.576 (0.151)*** 
1-3 months 0.247 (0.242) 
( ref. no training or in the past)   
C ontrol over own work   
Job has a fixed routine -0.491 (0.260)* 
Can choose order tasks -0.599 (0.236)** 
( ref. No one controls your work)   
 41
C ountry dummies   
Denmark 1.898 (0.418)*** 
France 0.866 (0.229)*** 
Greece 1.471 (0.238)*** 
Netherlands 1.118 (0.240)*** 
Spain 2.109 (0.287)*** 
Finland 0.993 (0.351)*** 
( ref. UK)    
    
ID var: Children over age 16  0.564 (0.154)*** 
cons  3.671 (7.018) 
N 18276 
Number of groups    3686 
Wald chi2(61)       952.39*** 
Log likelihood   -1427.37 
Notes:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; the regression has also 
controlled for the vignette characteristics, though they are omitted here as they are all insignificant 
variables. The full regression output is available from the authors upon request. 
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Endnotes 
 
i This resulted in labour hoarding during periods of weak demand, while it also enabled firms to attract 
and retain a high quality pool of workers, eliminate information asymmetries about their ability and 
productivity and foster specific training skills.  At the same time employees were likely to reciprocate to 
their employer’s loyalty by exerting greater effort.    
ii By subjective measures of well-being we mean survey data where individuals have been asked to rate, 
on some numerical scale, their satisfaction with life in general or with some sub-set of life satisfaction, 
such as job satisfaction.  In other words, such subjective measures are based on self-reported individual 
satisfaction.  This initiative has followed the lead of many years of psychological research, which has 
illustrated that comparisons of different measures of SWB are often mutually consistent.  In addition, 
Freeman’s (1978) pioneering work on the inverse relationship between job satisfaction and quit 
behaviour spurred a vast literature investigating the relationship between job satisfaction and various 
socio-economic characteristics such as gender, age, education, income, trade union status etc (See, 
among others, Borjas, 1979; Lillydahl and Singell, 1993; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1997; 
Drakopoulos and Theodossiou, 1997; Sloane and Williams 2000; Kaiser, 2002; van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2004; McCausland, Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005) and Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 
2005a). 
iii The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that contradicting elements of knowledge (cognitions) 
serve as a driving force that compel the human mind to modify existing beliefs. The existence of 
dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, motivates the person to reduce the dissonance and 
leads to avoidance of information likely to increase the dissonance. The greater the magnitude of the 
dissonance, the greater is the pressure to reduce dissonance. 
iv However, their study did find evidence that fixed-term contracts function as effective stepping-stones 
towards permanent jobs, especially for women. 
v Indeed, empirical evidence from the ECHP does confirm that the motive for holding a part-time job is 
crucial, in the sense that involuntary part time workers generally have the lowest job satisfaction 
amongst all employees, while voluntary part-timers are, on average, the happiest, even compared to full-
time workers (EPICURUS, 2004).   
vi The first studies on conjoint-analysis came from the field of marketing research (Luce and Tukey, 
1964 and Green and Srinivasan, 1978).  In these studies, respondents were often faced with the 
evaluation of a new consumer product before it was introduced in the market.  Recently this approach 
has also been widely applied to environmental and health economics.  Van Beek, Koopmans and Van 
Praag (1997) and Van Leeuwen and Van Praag (2002) were the first to have applied this approach to 
labour economics. 
vii With ranking, respondents are asked to list the vignettes in order of preference.  It provides us with an 
ordering, but it does not inform us about differences in strength of preference.  It yields an ordinal utility 
ordering.  Moreover, there are difficulties, when respondents feel indifferent with respect to two or more 
alternatives.  In the discrete choice method, respondents are asked to consider a set of vignettes and are 
invited to choose their preferred one.  Obviously the method yields less information than the ranking 
method, as we know only that one of the alternatives ranks highest, while we do not know anything 
about the ordering of the less than optimal alternatives.  The rating method requires the respondents to 
assign a score, of say 1 to 10, to each of the vignettes.  The rating method yields a cardinal preference 
ordering.  Needless to say, that for all types of response behavior a random error term has to be 
included.   
viii The decision to focus on the low-skilled part of the workforce was made due to the fact that this 
particular group of workers has born the brunt of the shift towards atypical and flexible forms of 
employment in most modern job markets (Employment in Europe, 2004). 
ix Defining the hourly wage in the vignette in terms of a relative deviation from the current wage of the 
respondent circumvents the usual problem of wage definition and the problems that arise if respondents 
with different wages evaluate the same vignettes. 
x The choice of the normal distribution function is irrelevant and could be replaced by any other 
distribution function that is a monotonically increasing function on a bounded interval. 
xi The justification for choosing to use random rather than fixed effects is twofold.  Firstly, a simple 
Hausman test reveals no systematic difference in the estimated coefficients between the random and 
fixed effects models.  Secondly, the random effects model allows for the assessment of the influence of 
individual variables like age, gender and educational level on the evaluation of the vignettes. 
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xii It was deemed necessary to pool all of the countries of the survey together as the sample of permanent 
and temporary workers in one country alone would be very small and would not allow for a robust 
econometric analysis. 
xiii In order to fulfil the identification requirements the chosen identifying restrictions Zi need to be 
orthogonal to the structural model - E(Zn′εj,n) = 0 (the exogeneity condition), but sufficiently partially 
correlated with Pn (the rank condition).  Of course, it is not a straightforward task to come up with valid 
instruments that satisfy these conditions, which is why the choice of variables sometimes appears as ad 
hoc.   
 
 
